Ryle and the para-mechanical by Benham, Bryan
BRYAN BENHAM 
Ryle and the Para-mechanical 
WINNER OF mE 1999 LARRY TAYLOR MEMORIAL AWARD 
The thesis of this paper is the unconventional claim that Gilbert Ryle is not a logical 
behaviorist. The popular account ofRyle clearly places his work in The Concept of Mind 
(1949) in the camp oflogical behaviorist.! The object of this paper, however, will be to 
illustrate how the conventional interpretation of Ryle is misleading. My argument is not 
an exhaustive account of Ryle, but serves as a starting point for understanding Ryle 
outside of the behaviorist label that is usually attached to his work. 
The argument is straightforward. First, it is apparent on any reasonable construal that 
logical behaviorism is a reductionist project about the mind. The basic claim of logical 
behaviorism is that statements containing mental vocabulary can be analyzed into 
statements containing only the vocabulary of physical behavior. Second, any reasonable 
account ofRyle will show that he is not a reductionist about the mental, in fact he was 
adamantly anti-reductionist about the mind. Once these two claims are established it 
follows quite readily that Ryle was not a logical behaviorist. 
The first premise is uncontroversial. Anyone familiar with logical behaviorism 
understands that its aim is to show that mental terminology doesn't refer to unobserved 
phenomena, supposedly in the head of the person described, but rather to the observed 
physical behaviors or dispositions to behave (Hempel 1999). In fact, in its strict 
formulation, logical behaviorism claims that mental terminology signifies only these 
observed behaviors or dispositions to behave. Thus, I will take it as a reasonably 
established claim that logical behaviorism is reductionist about the mind. . 
On the other hand, the claim that Ryle was anti-reductionist about the mind requires 
a bit more discussion, so I will focus my efforts here for the remainder of the paper. In 
short, my argument will be that if we interpret Ryle as a reductionist, this would go 
against everything that Ryle had been objecting to in The Concept of Mind. In effect, it 
would be to charge him with committing the same error, the same category mistake, as 
he accuses his opponent or opponents of making. This hardly seems charitable. Of 
course, Ryle could have been inconsistent in his own argumentation, but I think the 
simpler explanation is that the conventional interpretation misinterprets Ryle and his 
project in The Concept of Mind. 
Ryle's basic argument in The Concept of Mind is thought to be directed against 
Cartesian dualism, the so-called "dogma of the ghost in the machine." In short, the 
argument is that Cartesianism commits a category mistake. It treats the mind as if it 
belongs to one logical category when it actually belongs to another. Ryle's famous 
example of a category mistake is the confusions exhibited by a visitor to a university. 
The mistake is displayed when the visitor confuses the university with the buildings, 
fields, libraries, etc. he had seen while touring the campus, when in fact the university 
is not another building among buildings, but something else: the way in which the 
activities that occur in these buildings, fields, and libraries are administrated, organized, 
and legally structured. That is to say, the concept of a university does not belong to the 
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same category as t~ concept of a building, the concept of a field, or a library. The 
concepts are of different logical types. . 
According to the ordlodox interpntation, Ryle is at pains to show that Cartesianism 
commits an error of just this kind with regard to our concept ofth~mental. However, this 
is only part of the story: Ryle's arguments against dualism are meant to le equally 
applicable to materialism-and this incIlides behaviorism. Acconing to Ryle~s analysis 
both of these positions commit the same basic category, mistake wnen conceivlug of the 
mental. They each are committed to a conceptually confused description oftre mind, 
which Ryle calls "the para-mechanical hypothesis." 
The "para-mechanical hypothesis" is shorthand for what Ryle identifies as the 
underlying conceptual framework that shaped the Cartesian picture of our mental life. 
It is the view that in order for a person to qualifY as having a mind-as: being inteUigent, 
stupid, having beliefs, desiresr and so forth-it requires a certain kind of inner causal 
organization of the person or organism under question. The mind is some causal 
mechanism which operates behind a person's public and purposeful actions. To put it 
another way, it is the view that we need to appeal to some hidden, inner and causal 
mental occurrences of the person (such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.) in order to 
understand or make intelligible the actions of that person, especially those actions we 
classify as clever, voluntary, purposeful, or in a word, intelligent. 
Understood this way the para-mechanical hypothesis seems to be a very common-
sensical view of the mind, one widely held by dualists and non-dualists alike. When I 
want to explain the intelligent actions of a person I appeal to the beliefs, desires, and any 
other relevant mental states of the individual to make sense of what the person is doing. 
This works so often and with such a high rate of success that it seems obviously true. So 
it should strike us as odd to think that Ryle wants to argue that this conception of the 
mind is fundamentally in error. But I do not propose to defend Ryle's position, rather I 
want to show that he has been fundamentally misunderstood. To see this, we should 
examine why he is at odds with the para-mechanical hypothesis about the mental. 
Throughout The Concept of Mind Ryle has recourse to,a quasi-historical account of 
the possible motivations for a£cepting the para-mechanical hypothesis? According to 
this story Descartes was caught between two conflicting motives. The science of Galileo 
showed that his methods were competent tOl provide a mechanical theory which covers 
every occupant of space. As a man of science Descartes could not but endorse the claims 
of Galileo' s mechanics. On tie other hand, as a religious and moral man Descartes could 
not accept the consequences of these mechanics for human nature, and more importantly 
human freedom; the natureofhumanity could not simJiy be a maHer of the complexity 
of certain mechanical woriings. 
It was believed that 1iie physical sciences had established, rurwere on the way to 
establishing, that the things and events of the extemal world a.te rigidly go...erned by 
discoverable laws, laws the formulatiOil of which lIIimit no appraisal-words. It was felt 
that all external happenings are caafined within the iron !fooves of mechanical 
causation. The genesis, the properti&!s and the courses of these happenings were, or 
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would be, totally explained in terms of measurable and, it was supposed, therefore 
purposeless forces (Ryle 1949, 75). 
One way out of the this dilemma for Descartes and subsequent philosophers was to 
avoid conceiving of our mental life (our intentions, volitions, etc.) as a resident in the 
mechanically described world. A broad ontological distinction was made between the 
mental and material. To avoid the results of mechanism for human nature, mind was 
removed from such a world. However, there was obviously still some causal connection 
between the mind and the body. Intelligence still directed the body on appropriate 
occasions. Some causes of human behavior were thought to issue from the movement 
of particles of matter and others from the workings of minds or souls. That is, while 
some movements ofhurnan limbs and tongues are the effects of mechanical causes, other 
human actions must be the effects of non-mechanical causes, namely mental causes. The 
difference between intelligent, purposeful, or voluntary human actions and unintelligent 
or involuntary actions was thus understood as a difference in their causation. Descartes 
and others hoped to have preserved human dignity by construing mental concepts not as 
occurrences of mechanical processes, but instead as signifying special non-mechanical 
processes.3 
This attempt to preserve human freedom and dignity was, according to Ryle, a 
misconceived attempt. While trying to avert tthe problems of mechanism (viz., 
determinism, the impossibility of freewill, etc.) tneorists ended up describing minds in 
what was little more than a parallel vocabulaty;to mechanism. Minds are things, but 
different sorts of t~s from bodies; mental ]processes are causes and effects, but 
different sorts of causes and effects from bodily ,movements. And so con. Somewhat as 
the foreigner expected the U niver.Sity to be an eKtra edifice, rather like a college but also 
considerably differem, so the repudiators of mechanism represented minds as extra 
centers of causal processes, rather like machines ,but also considerably different from 
them. Their theory was a para-mechanical hypat:besis (ibid., 19). 
On Ryle's interpretation, Descartes and ot:ber:s unwittingly adhered to thegramrnar 
and categories of mechanics. The differences between the physical and the mental were 
represented as differences inside the. common framework of the categories of 'thing', 
'stuff', 'attnlmte', 'state', 'process'. ~a::hange', andmostimportantIy·cause' and <effect'. 
Instead of removing the mental from the mechariical the conception of the mental 
became and extension of the mechanical conception of the world. It was unseen, occult, 
inner, but not physical; y~t equally causal in its manifestations. So, according to Ryle, 
the mental and the phYSIcal were understood as being members of the same logical 
category, namely the mechanical. 
According to Ryle this identification of the mental within the same framework as the 
mechanical is the fundamental category mistake perpetuated by Descartes and others. 
He was quick to poi~t out tha~ this conception of the mental leads to some unsavory 
~onseq~ences. For .mst~ce, It leads to the well ~Ow? problem of mind-body 
interactIOn. If the rrnnd IS a causal locus of human actIon, It seems a difficult task to 
explain how a para-mechanical mind can interact with a mechanically caused world. But 
more serious consequences also follow on Ryle's analysis. 
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If the problem of the freedom of the will was the problem how to reconcile the 
hypothesis that minds are to be described in terms drawn from the categories of 
mechanics with the knowledge that higher-grade human conduct is not a piece with the 
behavior of machines, then, on Ryle's analysis it is apparently a problem that is 
unresolved. Since bodies are rigidly governed by mechanical laws, and the mental is 
understood as undergoing regular modifications according to some similar but not -quite-
mechanical (para-mechanical) processes, it seems to follow that the career of the mind 
is no less deterministic than the movements of physical bodies. That is to say, insofar as 
the mind is conceived as a species of the mechanical, then it is reasonable to expect that 
the mind is para-deterministic. In this case, the freedom of the will is not as safe as was 
originally thought. The para-mechanical hypothesis seems to undermine the very reasons 
for wanting to conceive of the mind as para-mechanical in the first place. 
Yet, the problems of mind-body interaction and the freedom of the will were not the 
only problems Ryle had with the para-mechanical hypothesis. He was concerned that 
adopting the para-mechanical hypothesis would make people absolutely mysterious and 
intractable, when in fact people are fairly easily managed and relatively easy to 
understand. 
According to Ryle, it is an historical curiosity that it was not noticed that the entire 
para-mechanical hypothesis was broken-backed. Theorists correctly answered that any 
sane man could already recognize the difference between say, rational and non-rational 
utterances or purposive and automatic behavior. Else there would have been nothing 
requiring to be salved from mechanism. Yet the explanation given presupposed that one 
person could in principle never recognize the difference between the rational and the 
irrational utterances. Save for the doubtful exception of himself, he could never tell the 
difference between a man and a robot (ibid., 20-21). 
Ryle points out that if mental concepts refer only to the hidden, inner causes of 
human behavior, then external observers could never know whether the overt actions 
were correlated with certain mental antecedents, so they could never know whether their 
ascription of mental concepts-such as intelligent, stupid, voluntary, clever, etc.-were 
correct or incorrect. If an action is, say, intelligent in virtue of an antecedent intelligent 
cause (as Ryle takes the para-mechanical hypothesis to indicate), we could never know 
the cause and thus never know the action was intelligent. 
The crux of the problem is that according to the para-mechanical description of the 
mental, the mind is thought of as a special kind of causal antecedent to behavior. 
However, if this were true our characterizations and explanations of the performances 
of persons as intelligent, stupid, rational, hypocritical, cowardly, brave, and so on, could 
never have been made. The original reason for providing a special causal theory of mind 
would never have arisen. Ryle claims this demonstrates that the para-mechanical 
hypothesis, and any doctrine that follows from it, is fundamentally in error. 
Ryle accuses these theorists of mistaking the logic of their problem. In effect, 
Descartes and others realized that the problem of accounting for rational, voluntary, 
intelligent human action in terms of mechanics would lead to certain difficulties, but 
then they assumed that the solution was a counterpart of mechanics. They asked, "Given 
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that the principle of mechanical causation does not tell us the difference between say 
autonomous and involuntary action, what other causal principle will tell us?" They 
conceived the problem as a causal problem-as a problem within the idiom of causes 
and effects, which, on Ryle's analysis, undermines the whole para-mechanical project. 
At this point we could object to Ryle's treatment of the para-mechanical hypothesis 
on a number of accounts, but it is not my purpose to defend or criticize his position here. 
Rather we are trying to understand how Ryle could be anti-reductionist about the mind. 
So it is important to keep in mind what Ryle thinks he has done with this analysis of the 
para-mechanical hypothesis. The central point seems to be that the problems of a 
Cartesian picture of mind, namely the problems of mind-body interaction, the freedom 
of the will, and even the problem of other minds, are merely symptomatic of a deeper 
conceptual confusion. This confusion consists in thinking of the mental as being of a 
type with the causal or mechanical. That is, much as thinking of a university as another 
building among buildings is a confusion about the concept of a university, so too taking 
the mind to be another causal component of the world is a confusion about the concept 
of the mental. It is a category mistake. 
If Ryle's argument is successful it will have devastating implications for how we 
conceive of the mental. But these consequences won't just affect dualist accounts, they 
will be equally applicable to materialist theories of mind. For ifRyle's central criticism 
of the para-mechanical hypothesis is that 'mind' and 'body' are erroneously understood 
as being terms of the same logical type, then Ryle would resist the notion that the mental 
could be reduced to the physical. And indeed Ryle makes a point of this. 
Ryle argues that in order for two terms to be legitimately conjoined or legitimately 
opposed they must belong to the same category (ibid., 22 f). But mind and matter, or the 
mental and the mechanical do not belong to the same categories. Thus conjoining them 
or opposing them is logically illegitimate. For example, to say that she has just 
purchased a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove is a logically legitimate conjunction 
of "left-hand glove" and "right-hand glove." However, it would be illegitimate to say she 
bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove, and a pair of gloves. That is, to understand 
all three term as being members of the same logical type would mean that she bought 
three distinct and separate items, and this is absurd. This is exactly what Ryle accuses 
the Cartesians of doing, and by extension the para-mechanical hypothesis about the 
mental: "It maintains that there exists both bodies and minds; that there occur physical 
processes and mental processes; that there are mechanical causes of corporeal 
movements and mental causes of corporeal movements" (22). 
Now the reduction of mental states and processes to physical states and processes 
that materialism suggests presupposes the legitimacy of the conjunction of mind and 
matter. In other words, mind and matter are considered as two types of mechanical 
entities, in particular as purveyors of causes and effects. But this is precisely what Ryle 
is at pains to argue against in his analysis of the para-mechanical hypothesis. If mind and 
matter are no longer seen as sharing the same logical category, then materialism is just 
as mistaken as dualism. 
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It will also follow that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper 
question. The 'reduction' of the material world to mental states and processes, as well 
as the 'reduction' of mental states and processes to physical states and processes, 
presuppose the legitimacy of the disjunction "Either there exist minds or their exist 
bodies (but not both)." It would be like saying "Either sITe bought a left-hand and a right-
hand glove or she bought a pair of gIoves (but not both)!" (ibid. 22-23). 
With this I think we can say that Ryle was indeed anti'-reductionist about the mind. 
He resists the reduction of mental states to physical states. because he thinks they are of 
different logical types. To think that they can be reduced isto commit the same category 
mistake as Cartesianism; it is to perpetuate the para-mechanical description of the 
mental. 
Ifwe interpret logical behaviorism as attempting to translate all mental propositions 
into propositions about observed or expected behavior (as I think we should), then it is 
misleading to interpret Ryle as a logical behaviorist. Bearing in mind what was just 
discussed regarding the legitimacy of reducing mind to matter, if we were to press the 
point and still interpret Ryle as a logical behaviorist, this would be tantamount to 
accusing Ryle of committing the same category mistakes he accuses dualists and 
materialists of committing. This interpretation is obviously uncharitable. 4 
This argument, I think. provides very strong reasons for rejecting the conventional 
interpretation ofRyle as a logical behaviorist. As such the immediate aim of this paper 
has been fulfilled. However, removing the orthodox interpretation of Ryle as a logical 
behaviorist is not so simple a task. More would have to be said about the passages in 
Ryle's work that appear to proclaim a behaviorist position. Some discussion of the 
proper logical category for mental terms according to Ryle, would also be needed. The 
present argument is simply a starting point for reinterpreting Ryle's work. 
I want to close with this final remark. In his book Dilemmas (1954) Ryle advises us 
that "to understand the work of an original philosopher it is necessary to see-and not 
merely to see but to feel-the logical impasse by which he was held up. We should 
always be asking the question 'Just what was the conceptual fix that he was in? What 
dilemma was pinching him?'" (125). This is especially true in understanding Ryle 
himself His work, I would argue, is best understood as a reevaluation and wholesale 
rejection of the traditional answers to the question "What is Man?" Ryle's central 
concern, the logical impass~ that perturbs him, is how to understand human nature. It 
may not be clear what answer Ryle would like to give to this problem. However, what 
is clear, given the content of this paper, is that neither the dualist answer nor the 
materialist answer are satisfactory for Ryle. "Man need not be degraded a machine by 
being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He might, after alL be a sort of animal, namely, 
a higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that 
perhaps he is a man" (Ryle 1949, 328). 
Notes 
L Reviews and booksabotmd with such references to his alleged logical behaviorism (see, e.g., Wisdom 
1950; Hampshire 1970; Hofstadter 1951; Miller 1951; Weitz 1951; Garnett 1952; Pap 1952;.Geach 1957; 
Russell 1958; Smart 1963; Armstrong 1968; Le\vis 1972; Fodor 1975; Denm:n:1978; Rorty 1979; and Stich 
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1983, just to name a few). One noteworthy exception is Park (1994), who attempts to give a strictly non-
behavioristic analysis ofRyle's position. 
2. This story is present throughout Ryle 1949, but he first uses it in 18-19; see also 23-24 and 76 if. 
Similar accounts also occur in Ryle 1954, especially in chapters 5 and 6; and in his posthumously published 
notes on the freedom of the will in Ryle 1993. ' 
3. The historical accuracy of this story is not the central issue here. Ryle could and did concede that any 
number of historical precedents could be used to illustrate his point. He focuses on Descartes because he most 
clearly delineated the issue. 
4. It is more dubious when we also consider Ryle's explicit denials of being a behaviorist. See Ryle 
1949,327-29; and his interview in Magee 1971. 
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